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Abstract. Previous work has shown that species interacting in an ecosystem and
actors transacting in an economic context may have notable similarities in behavior.
However, the specific mechanism that may underlie similarities in nature and human
systems has not been analyzed. Building on stochastic food-web models, we propose
a parsimonious bipartite-cooperation model that reproduces the key features of
mutualistic networks - degree distribution, nestedness and modularity – for both
ecological networks and socio-economic networks. Our analysis uses two diverse
networks. Mutually-beneficial interactions between plants and their pollinators, and
cooperative economic exchanges between designers and their contractors. We find
that these mutualistic networks share a key hierarchical ordering of their members,
along with an exponential constraint in the number and type of partners they can
cooperate with. We use our model to show that slight changes in the interaction
constraints can produce either extremely nested or random structures, revealing that
these constraints play a key role in the evolution of mutualistic networks. This could
also encourage a new systematic approach to study the functional and structural
properties of networks. The surprising correspondence across mutualistic networks
suggests their broadly representativeness and their potential role in the productive
organization of exchange systems, both ecological and social.
21. Introduction
The analogy between ecological and economic systems is not new. Biologists have
always being intrigued about the economic aspects of nature [1, 2], and economists
and sociologists have taken insight from biological systems to shed new light on
the factors shaping socio-economic systems. For instance, researchers have adapted
biological models that focus on constructs such as niche width, resource partitioning, or
specialization and generalization to explain the birth and death rates of organizational
populations [3, 4]. More recently, multidisciplinary approaches have led to the discovery
of significant structural similarities across different network domains, including biological
and socio-economic networks [5, 6, 7]. This has awakened an even more spirited search
for common structural properties between ecological and economic networks [8, 9], and
pointed to a greater need for work on mutually-beneficial interactions across realms.
Cooperation [10, 11, 12] is a central concept in biological and social studies,
and although the evolution of cooperation was initially modeled for homogeneous
populations, subsequent work has also included spatial effects [13]. The recent
development of simulation models for evolutionary games on graphs [14] and
collaborative social networks [15] provides a starting point for addressing the question
of how cooperative structures are assembled. In ecology, contemporary research on
mutualistic networks provides us with an increasingly detailed picture of the complex set
of cooperative interactions between different species in an ecosystem, and demonstrates
that purely local interactions can generate highly structured macroscopic patterns of
mutually beneficial exchanges [16].
However, despite the increasing interest in cooperative systems, we currently lack
models that allow us to connect the cooperative behavior at the level of individuals
with emergent global network properties. Furthermore, although cooperation appears
as distinctive characteristic at different levels of organization ranging from groups of
animals to human society [17], it has been difficult to find empirical evidence showing
similar patterns of cooperation shared across these levels. In previous work [18], we have
proposed a bipartite-cooperation model (BC model) that can replicate key properties
of mutualistic networks. To test the BC model across ecological and socio-economic
networks, we have used ten large pollination datasets that have been compiled in
the literature, and a unique and extensive, economy -wide dataset of designers and
contractors engaged in joint production in the New York City garment industry. In the
present paper, we attempt to go beyond showing associations in the assembling principles
of these ecological and socio-economic networks to show the effects of different organizing
mechanisms on the hierarchical arrangement of these networks. In Sections 2 and 3 we
discuss some of the main features of mutually-beneficial interactions in ecological and
socio-economic networks respectively. Sections 4, 5 and 6 describe the BC model, the
empirical data and the validation of the BC model respectively. Section 7 introduces a
further justification of the BC model using empirical data. In Section 8 we use the BC
model to study the effects of different organizing mechanisms and interaction constraints
3on the hierarchical arrangement of empirical networks. Finally, Section 9 summarizes
our conclusions and overall findings.
2. Ecological networks
In ecology, mutualistic networks are formed by the mutually-beneficial interactions
between populations of different species (e.g. P for plants and A for animals) [16].
Species in class P offer rewards with certain characteristics to attract species in class
A. These individual attributes, determined by their own reward traits, may also have
evolved to reduce exploitation and favor mutualism [19]. Species in class A foraging
for resources can benefit from the rewards offered by a given species in class P if the
respective foraging traits (e.g. efficiency, morphology, behavior) and reward traits
(e.g. quantity, quality, availability) are complementary [20, 21]. External factors
such as the environmental context (e.g. population density, geographic variation)
attenuate or amplify the value of reward and foraging traits, and impact the number
of potential partners that a given species cooperates with [22, 23, 24]. Furthermore,
Rezende et al.[25] have shown that mutualistic networks exhibit hierarchical constraints
introduced by phylogenetic relationships between species in the same class, which impact
mutualistic interaction patterns by favoring ecological similarity.
Recent work has found key structural properties in mutualistic networks. Mutually-
beneficial interactions between species exhibit broad-scale distributions and a significant
presence of asymmetric interactions (i.e. links connecting high-degree to low-degree
nodes), which can be the result of mechanisms such as aging, forbidden interactions,
capacity constraints, etc. [20, 26, 27]. Mutualistic networks also display nested and
modular structures that differ from appropriate random assemblages, which play a
crucial role in structural robustness and function of these networks [28, 23]. In addition,
studies have found that the relationship between the number of species S and mutually-
beneficial interactions L follows a power-law given by L = Sα, where α = 1.13 [28].
This suggests that mutualistic networks might display a universal mode of organization
that appears to enhance the ability of species to respond to environmental changes and
competition pressures [16, 29, 30].
3. Socio-economic networks
Exchanges and beneficial relationships between members in social and economic contexts
are also known to give rise to large-scale cooperative networks through which resources
and information can flow [31, 32, 33, 34]. In an organizational context, firms are
characterized by a set of reward or organizational traits (e.g. firm size, competitive niche
space, brand positioning), which are modulated by hierarachical barriers generated by
differences in status, which limit the number and range of potential partners [4, 3, 35, 36].
Hence, cooperation between two different classes of firms (e.g designers and contractors
in a manufacturing industry) can also be subject to structural constraints equivalent
4to those found in ecological networks. These constraints depend on the traits of firms
and the complementarity between traits of potential partners, as well as hierarchical
relationships between firms in the same class. Note that the values associated with
reward traits and interaction barriers between firms are not absolute, but modulated by
the specific market context that the firms operate in [4, 35].
Interestingly, in common with mutualistic networks, studies have found that the
number of collaborative partners in different socio-economic networks follows a broad-
scale distribution characterized by asymmetric interactions, which not only prevent
the network from collapsing, but also enhance the efficiency of the network [34, 37].
Previously, we found that although the total number of firms F in socio-economic
network varies from year to year, the relation between the total number of firms and links
L also follows a constant relation [18]. Figure 1 shows that this relation is defined by a
power-law L = F α with α = 1.22. In addition, structurally cohesive social networks do
enhance a hierarchical nesting of groups [38]. These results suggest that mutualistic
networks and cooperative socio-economic networks might have both structural and
organizing mechanism in common.
4. The bipartite-cooperation model
In theoretical ecology, stochastic models incorporating simple interaction rules have
recently proved remarkably successful at reproducing overall structural properties of
real food webs [39, 40]. Food webs are formed by interactions between predators
and preys that reflect all possible flows of energy and biomass between species in
an ecosystem. It has been shown that these models need to satisfy only two basic
conditions about the distribution of niche values and feeding ranges to reproduce many
aspects of the complex network of predator-prey interactions, using species richness S
and connectance L/S2 as the only input parameters [41]. These two basic conditions
are: (1) an ordered set of species’ niche values; (2) an exponentially decaying probability
of preying on species with lower niche values. Note that niche values can be better
explained by a hierarchical ordering of body-sizes [42]. Recently, more detailed models
have incorporated higher levels of constraints in order to reproduce the actual links
observed in real food webs [43, 44, 45]. Hence, the notable success in modeling the
complex set of predator-prey interactions between species has suggested that simple
models may equally well account for the structure of networks generated by cooperative
partner-partner interactions between two distinct classes of species, as in the case of
plant-animal mutualistic networks [46, 47].
Here, building on food web models [39, 40], we developed the BC model that applies
when members in a network can be divided into two distinct classes (e.g. class P and
class A). Hence, the inputs for the BC model are the size of class A, the size of class P
and the total number of links L, all of which are given directly by the empirical data.
The BC model consists of a specialization and an interaction mechanism, which are
motivated by the fact that specialists (members with low number of partners) will face
5less competition and fewer interaction barriers by cooperating with generalists (members
with high number of partners) [30].
(i) Specialization. The specialization rule determines how many partners lp each
member p ∈ P will cooperate with, and is calculated following the nested-hierarchy
model [40]. The number of partners lp is given by lp = 1 + Round(
(L−|P |)tRpλp)∑
j
tRjλj
),
where | · | denotes set cardinality and Round(·) is the nearest integer function.
Here, tRp is the reward trait associated with member p, uniformly drawn from
[0, 1], attenuated or amplified by an external constraint λp, randomly drawn from
an exponential distribution (described below), that accounts for effects such as
geographic variation and population diversity. Reward traits tRp are the result of
a hierarchical process, which in the BC model corresponds to the generation of an
ordered sequence in trait space, so tRp plays an equivalent role to the niche value
in the niche model [39].
(ii) Interaction. The interaction rule determines which members a ∈ A cooperate
with each member p ∈ P . Mutualistic interactions are hierarchically limited by
the complementarity between reward traits tRp for p ∈ P and foraging traits tFa
for a ∈ A, which both are uniformly drawn from [0, 1]. Members from class P
are sorted according to their reward trait tRp in ascending order given their ability
to attract partners; whereas members from class A are sorted according to their
foraging traits tFa in descending order given their ability to cooperate with partners.
Starting from the first -specialist- member pi and continuing sequentially subject to
tRpi > λlpi , each link lpi is connected to the first -generalist- member a
′ ∈ A′, where
A′ is the subset of members in A that have not already been linked to by another
member p 6= pi. If tRpi ≤ λlpi, the link is randomly connected to another member
a′′ ∈ A′′ that belongs to a previously randomly selected member pj with lower trait
value, where A′′ is the subset of members in A that have been allocated links in a
previous timestep. This is to say, for each individual link of the new member pi,
first we randomly select a different member pj with lower trait value, and second
we randomly select a member a′′ from the partners of pj . This process is repeated
independently for each individual link. Note that λlpi corresponds to an external
constraint associated with each link lpi that accounts for interaction barriers such
as competition and population density. This is drawn randomly from the same
exponential distribution as λp (described below). In applying the interaction rule,
if the supply of partners in either subset A′ or A′′ is exhausted before all lpi links
have been allocated, then partners in the other subset are chosen to instead. The
effect of this additional rule is equivalent to imposing a size limit on the population
[46]. The BC model is initialized by connecting the first member pi to lpi members
in A′.
In line with prior food web models [41], and in order to account for inhomogeneous
effects in the population, we assume that external constraints λp and λlp are randomly
drawn from an exponential distribution given by p(x) = βexp(−βx), with β =
6|P |(|A| − 1)/(2(L− |P |))− 1. Note that L/(A · P ) is equivalent to the connectance of
a bipartite network. As has been shown [41], this exponential distribution is equivalent
to a beta distribution under low-connectance levels. We also found that the BC model
produces similar results using a beta distribution of the form p(x) = β(1 − x)β−1 (see
supplementary information in [18]).
5. Empirical data
In the present paper, we use a diverse set of ten extensive plant-animal pollination
networks compiled in the literature (see Table), which can clearly be distinguished from
random assemblages [28]. Mutually-beneficial interactions in a pollination network are
formed when an animal such as a bee or wasp gets food in form of nectar in exchange
of transferring pollen from one plant to another of the same species. Hence, mutually-
beneficial interactions are established by the transportation mechanism, which enables
fertilization and sexual reproduction for plants.
Our observed socio-economic network uses information collected by the workers
union UNITE (Union of Needle Trades and Industrial and Textile Employees) on the
designer-contractor network of the New York Garment Industry (NYGI). UNITE has
organized around 90 percent of all firms in the NYGI, and has developed a reliable system
to ensure the validity of transaction data [32]. The dataset includes approximately
700,000 designer-contractor bilateral exchanges from January 1985 to December 2003.
We formed yearly network snapshots from 1985-2003 given the seasonality and volatility
of the NYGI industry [34]. A cooperative interaction exists between a designer and
contractor if they co-produce a garment in a particular year. For example, the typical
production process in a year begins with a designer that develops a line of clothing.
Each garment in the line is made into a sample prototype, which is disassembled into
its component parts such as shelves, collars, waistbands, and so forth. The components
of the sample are then sent by the designer to contractors that cut components from
fabric in lots large enough to be mass produced. The cut fabric is then sent by the
designer to sewing contractors that sew the fabric together into the garments that are
sold directly to consumers at retailers. All firms are free to make connections of their
own choice; there is no governing body that suggests or mandates connections (see [34]
for more details on the data).
6. Model validation
To analyze the performance of the BC model, we measure the ability of the BC model
at reproducing the degree distribution, nestedness and modularity of both pollination
networks and the NYGI networks. These network metrics are key organizational features
present in networks formed by bipartite cooperation [20, 28, 23, 30]. To capture the
statistical relevance of our model-generated networks, we use a Kolmogorov-Smirnov
(KS) comparison test and a z-score analysis (i.e. normalized errors) to test the overall
7goodness of fit of the BC model to the empirical data. All comparisons are based
on 1000 model simulations for each network (for comparisons of the BC model to
other mutualistic models see supplementary information in [18]). In the BC model,
plants and designers are treated as members of class P , and animals and contractors
as members of class A. This also follows the rationale that animals and contractors
might experience higher competitive pressures than animals and contractors, given the
differences in population size. From the Table we can see that the ratio between plants
animals is P/A < 0.5, which also plays a significant role limiting the appearance of
scale-free distributions [46].
6.1. Degree distribution
The degree distribution P (k) is a widely used statistical metric that measures the
probability that a node has up to k network connections [5, 6, 7]. This measure
affects network growth and decline in different complex networks [34, 48]. Figures 2A
and 2B show the scaled cumulative distribution for members of class P and members
of class A respectively. Note that pollination networks (solid symbols) and NYGI
networks (crosses) exhibit the same patterns in both degree distributions. The solid
line corresponds to the model-generated degree distributions. The Table shows that the
BC model reproduced most of the empirical distributions.
6.2. Nestedness
Nestedness is a concept applied in ecology to metacommunity populations, where sites
with low biodiversity constitute proper subsets of sites with higher biodiversity [49]. This
has been extended to ecological networks, where a network is said to be nested when
specialist species interact with proper subsets of the ecological interactions of generalist
species [27]. To calculate nestedness N , we use the BINMATNEST program [50]. This
program uses a genetic algorithm to find the matrix configuration that minimizes the
level of disorder, and calculates an isocline curve that is used to measure the distance
to the situation of perfect order or nestedness for each pair-wise interaction. Here
nestedness is defined in the interval [0,1], where 1 corresponds to a perfectly nested
network. In addition, we use a null model (i.e. randomized version) to compare whether
the empirical networks and model-generated networks are indeed different from random
assemblages. For this, we use the null model II proposed in [27], which has been shown
to produce conservative results with respect to nestedness [51].
Figure 3A and 3B displays the nestedness pattern for empirical networks (dashed
line), random assemblages (red), and model-generated networks (blue) for pollination
networks and NYGI networks respectively. The dashed line would correspond to a
perfect agreement with the observed values. Bars are equivalent to avg.± 2s.d. values
-a nestedness of 1 means a perfectly nested matrix-. Note that the BC model always
performs significantly better than random assemblages. To capture the statistical
relevance of our model-generated nestedness values, we use a z-score analysis given
8by Z = (N − Nm)/σm where N is the nestedness value for the empirical network, and
Nm and σm are the average nestedness value and the standard deviation for the model-
generated network respectively. Our Table shows the high goodness of fit of the BC
model at reproducing the empirical nestedness values for the observed ecological and
NYGI networks. Different nestedness algorithms do not change the qualitative nature
of our results [52, 53].
6.3. Network modularity
The third characteristic that we analyze is network modularity [54]. The modularity
of a network depends on its number of groups or modules and on the deviations from
the number of groups expected in a properly randomized network [54]. The modularity
values Q for the networks were calculated using the one-mode optimization algorithm
[55]. A good partition generates many within-community links and as few as possible
between-community links. This algorithm does not discriminate between plants and
pollinators or designers and contractors, where communities comprise nodes from both
classes. This is important because we want to extract only cooperative units from the
network, and using a two-module partition algorithm [56] (i.e. modules with only one
class of nodes), we could erroneously form communities between competitive members
instead.
To test our fit, we are not looking for a specific partition of the network [57], but
a standard and well defined benchmark of comparison. Recent work has shown that
half of the pollination networks studied in the present paper are modular (see Table)
[23]. Using again a z-score analysis, the Table shows a surprisingly high degree of
correspondence between the five empirical modularity values and the model-generated
ones. For all the observed NYGI networks, we always found higher modularity values
compared to properly randomized networks [55] (p-value < 10−6), while the BC model
produced good approximations to the empirical modularity (see Table 1). Shifting our
focus to the individual level, nodes have different connectivity roles according to their
number and distribution of connections within and outside their own community [55].
Guimera` and Nunes Amaral [55] have heuristically established seven different roles for
nodes: roles 1-4 define different non-hub nodes, roles 5-7 are assigned for different classes
of hub nodes, and the higher the role the higher the connectivity of the node with other
communities. This categorization scheme classifies nodes according to their normalized
within-module degree zi and a participation coefficient PCi with the rest of the modules.
Figure 4A and 4B show the connectivity-role space generated for a pollination and a
NYGI network respectively. Note the similar patterns between the two networks. Plants
and designers (black dots) are mainly the nodes acting as hubs (roles 5-6), while animals
and contractors (red crosses) show high connectivity among modules (roles 3-4).
To test the ability of the BC model to accurately reproduce the same number of
nodes within each connectivity role observed in the empirical networks, we measured the
Pearson correlation and the ratio of the connectivity role norms d for the observed and
9model-generated networks. The ratio of the norms d is defined by d = |x| / |y|, where
|x| =
√∑
m
i=1x
2
i ; |y| =
√∑
m
i=1y
2
i ; m is the number of connectivity roles; and x and y
are the proportion of nodes within each role i for the empirical and model-generated
networks respectively. Note that the ratio measures the relative length between two
vectors in an m-dimensional space, and values within 0.9 < d < 1.1 are fractions
with a norm comparable to the empirical data. We consistently find values aligned
with the empirical measurements for the pollination and NYGI networks (r = 0.98,
0.9 < d < 1.1). In Figures 5A and 5B, bars confirm the accuracy of the BC model
(avg. ± 1s.d.) to reproduce the same number of nodes within each connectivity role
(circles) for pollination networks and NYGI networks respectively.
7. Ecological niche markets
As previously mentioned, a key feature in food-web models is the existence of a
hierarchical organization established by niche values. In the BC model we also assumed
that members in the population are classified according to a niche or hierarchical
value. In pollination networks, these niches or hierarchies can be the result of different
morphological, temporal and geographical variables that constrain the amount and
identity of partners [23, 24, 25]. Similarly, firms face interaction barriers according
to their niche or position in the market [4, 35]. This position can be assessed by the
diversity of products and the hierarchical nesting of groups [38]. Here, to empirically
test this organizational feature on the NYGI network, we analyze the extent to which
the emerging communities in the network correspond to actual niche markets.
To identify the communities or groups in the network, we use the same community
detection algorithm that we used in Section 6.3 to validate the BCmodel [55]. To identify
the niche of a community, we use data on the different types of garment (i.e. men’s coats,
women’s skirts, t-shirts, etc.) that a firm designs or manufactures. Thus, the diversity
of products or garment could be taken as a proxy for the niche characteristics of a
particular community. This is to say, two different communities of firms would be in
separated niches if they produce different products. We measure the correlation between
communities and products using a principal components analysis. To do this we built a
matrix P , where each element Pij corresponds to the percentage of firms in community
i working on garment j. Using this matrix, we calculated the correlation of products
between communities given by a transformation of values Pij into principal components
(i.e. eigenvectors). Using the two largest eigenvalues, which accounted for the 95% of
the variability (see Figure 6A), we generated a two-dimensional projection of the values.
Figure 6B shows the projection (dots) and in fact reveals different production trends
(i.e different positions in the two-dimensional space) between communities.
To test whether the niche or product differentiation is an artifact of the different
number of firms in a community, for each community i we measure its level of production
diversification defined by d(i) =
∑
j(Pij)
2. Here, d(i) = 0 if every firm in the community
works on a different product, and d(i) = 1 if all firms work on a single type of product.
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The correlation between the size of a community and its level of product diversification
was r = 0.01, which confirms that the network’s organizational structure is confirmed by
non-structural niche barriers. Hence, we believe future studies should investigate how
the model-generated ordering map into empirical hierarchies at the level of individuals.
8. Organizing mechanisms
Social networks, metabolic networks, socio-economic networks, and ecological networks,
among others display network structures that differ from random assemblages [5, 6, 7,
34]. These comparisons are based on an appropriate randomization of the network
(i.e. null model), which assigns a probability p to the existence of each pairwise
interaction. These null models can range from models that only preserve the number of
connections in the network (e.g. p = L/S2) to models that keep the actual distribution
of connections intact and allow a further exploration of the structural correlations in
the network [58, 59]. However, null models based on organizing mechanisms rather
than structural characteristics in the network have not been fully explored. Here, we
make use of the BC model to show the effects that different constraints acting over
the organizing mechanisms of mutualistic networks might produce on the hierarchical
or nested structure of ecological networks, which is a key feature in the robustness and
biodiversity of these systems [27, 30].
In the BC model, the number and identity of partners are constrained by a
hierarchical ordering, which are modulated by an external factor λp and λlpi acting
over the specialization and interaction mechanisms respectively. In line with food web
models [41], we have assumed random inhomogeneous values for λp and λlpi given by
an exponential distribution. In food webs, this distribution imposes a specific range
of possible interactions, which might correspond to the actual handling and foraging
capacities of species [43]. To study the effects of these constraints on the specialization
and interaction mechanisms of the BC model, we replaced the exponential distribution
by a randomly uniformed distribution. By modifying the specialization mechanism
alone (i.e. λp), we found nestedness values below the ones displayed by the observed
pollination networks. In line with standard null models, Figure 7 shows an under-
representation of nestedness by using both the modified version of the BC model (red
line) and the standard null model II (blue line) [27]. This suggests that the exponential
distribution limiting the number of connections for plants might in fact be responsible for
the nested organization of pollination networks. However, if we modify the interaction
mechanism (i.e. λlpi), we found the opposite behavior. Figure 7 (green line) shows an
over-representation of nestedness compared to the observed networks. Figure 7 (black
line) confirms that this pattern is robust even if we modify both the specialization and
the interaction mechanisms simultaneously. These results suggest that the organization
of mutualistic networks is neither extremely nested nor random, which might emerge
as a compromise between the structural robustness (specialization mechanism) and the
functionality of the network (interaction mechanism). We believe this conjecture should
11
be tested in future work.
9. Conclusions
The study of direct member-to-member interactions have allowed us to find that the
structure of ecological and socio-economic networks generated by mutually-beneficial
interactions exhibits remarkably similar features. This empirical finding motivates the
proposed model for bipartite cooperation, starting from a generalization of the niche
model [39], which can successfully reproduce the overall structure of pollination and
NYGI networks using the number of members and the total number of links as the
only input parameters. We have identified common organizing mechanisms operating
in these radically different networks, which are the result of a hierarchical ordering that
favors the presence of asymmetric interactions between their members. These organizing
mechanisms are exponentially constrained by external factors (such as environmental
and market pressures), which modulate the number and identity of potential partners.
Using our model, we investigated the effects that different constraints acting on the
specialization and interaction mechanisms of mutualistic networks might produce on the
hierarchical arrangement of these networks. We have found that real-world mutualistic
networks display network organizations, which are between highly nested and random
structures. This could enable a systematic approach to study the interplay between
functionality and structural robustness in mutualistic networks. The success of this
simple stochastic model in generating the overall structural characteristics of mutualistic
networks makes it a suitable starting point for more elaborate ecological and socio-
economic models which seek to understand the effects of changes in population size,
number of interactions, and harsher environmental or market conditions.
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Dataset-environment L P A KSP −KSA N Q
Kato and Miura (1996) 430 64 187 0.326†† − 0.438†† 0.976††(0.969) 0.551††(0.553)
Primack (1983) 374 41 139 0.633†† − 0.385†† 0.957††(0.96) 0.474†(0.465)
Kato et al. (1993) 865 90 354 0.552††-0.001* 0.985†(0.976) 0.545†(0.532)
Primack (1983) 120 18 60 0.108† − 0.999†† 0.858*(0.936) 0.553∗∗(0.527)
Primack (1983) 346 49 118 0.002*-0.001* 0.961††(0.955) 0.480†(0.468)
Hocking (1968) 179 28 81 0.097† − 0.989†† 0.971†(0.950) nm
Inouye and Pyke (1988) 252 36 81 0.608†† − 0.076† 0.935††(0.949) nm
Schemske et al. (1978) 65 7 33 0.911†† − 0.642†† 0.953†(0.930) nm
Elberling and Olsesen (1999) 453 31 75 0.038**−0.118†) 0.793*(0.914) nm
Elberling and Olsesen (1999) 242 24 118 0.223†-0.005**) 0.927†(0.952) nm
NYGI (1985) 7250 823 2562 0.061† − 0.115† 0.997†(0.996) 0.598*(0.502)
NYGI (1991) 3981 325 1590 0.101† − 0.531†† 0.994††(0.993) 0.601*(0.529)
NYGI (1997) 1450 148 700 0.003**−0.264† 0.990†(0.988) 0.653**(0.625)
NYGI (2003) 228 62 128 0.370† − 0.002** 0.976†(0.969) 0.711†(0.700)
Table 1. Model Validation. For ten pollination datasets and four NYGI networks
used in this paper, the table presents its source; total number of links L, P
and A are the number of members in class P and class A respectively. For the
degree distributions, (KSP − KSA) shows the combined Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS)
probability using the two-group equivalence KS test between the empirical and model-
generated distributions for class P and class A respectively. N and Q correspond
to the observed nestedness and mean modularity values respectively, along with the
normalized errors (z-score) for the comparison between the empirical and model-
generated values. The model-generated mean values for N and Q are shown inside
the parentheses. Five of the observed pollination networks have already been found to
be non-modular (nm) [28].
††: KS > 0.30 or normalized errors < 1 model s.d. (excellent fit); †: KS < 0.30 or
normalized errors between 1 and 2 model s.d. (good fit); **: KS < 0.05 or normalized
errors between 2 and 3 model s.d. (poor fit); *: KS < 0.01 or normalized errors > 3
model s.d. (bad fit).
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Figure 1. Scale invariability. The figure shows the relationship on a log-log scale
between the total number of firms F and links L in the NYGI network from 1985 to
2003 (dots). The solid line is the fit to the data defined by L = Fα with α = 1.22±0.01
(R2 = 0.98). This reveals that although the NYGI network experienced a dramatic
contraction over the years in its total number of links and firms [34], declining from
over 3000 firms in 1985 to 190 firms in 2003, the proportion between firms and links
remained constant.
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Figure 2. Cumulative degree distribution. Panel A and Panel B show the scaled
cumulative degree distribution Pcum(k) for members of class P (plants, designers), and
members of class A (animals, contractors) respectively. The number of partners k is
scaled by a multiplicative factor of 1/zP for members of P, and 1/zA for members of
A, where zP = L/P and zA = L/A. Solid symbols correspond to pollination networks
and crosses correspond to NYGI networks. Note that all distributions collapse into a
single curve. The solid line corresponds to the model-generated distributions averaged
over 1000 simulations.
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Figure 3. Nestedness. Panel A and Panel B compare the random-generated (red)
and model-generated (blue) nestedness values to the observed nestedness values for the
pollination and NYGI networks respectively. The dashed line would correspond to a
perfect agreement with the observed values. Bars are equivalent to avg.± 2s.d. values.
Here, a nestedness of 1 means a perfectly nested matrix.
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Figure 4. Empirical connectivity roles. Panel A and Panel B show the connectivity-
role space for members of the Kato and Miura (1996) network and the 1997 NYGI
network respectively. Plants and designers are shown in black dots, whereas animals
and contractors in red crosses. Note that the two networks present similar patterns.
The classification is as follows [55]: Nodes with z ≥ 2.5 are classified as module hubs
and nodes with z < 2.5 as non-hub nodes. In addition, hubs and non-hub nodes
are classified according to the corresponding participation coefficient PC. For non-
hub nodes (R1) is for nodes with all their links connected within their own module
P ≤ 0.05, (R2) is for nodes with most of their links connected within their own module
0.05 < P ≤ 0.62, (R3) is for nodes with many links connected to other modules
0.62 < P ≤ 0.80 and (R4) is for nodes with their links homogeneously connected to
all other modules P > 0.80. For hub-nodes, (R5) is for nodes with most of their links
connected to their own module P ≤ 0.30, (R6) is for nodes with most of their links
connected to other modules 0.30 < P ≤ 0.75 and (R7) is for nodes with their links
homogeneously connected to all other modules P > 0.75.
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Figure 5. Model validation for connectivity roles. Panel A and Panel B show
the proportion of members within each connectivity role for the modular pollination
networks and the NYGI networks respectively. The bars show the accuracy of the BC
model to reproduce the same number of nodes within each connectivity role (circles) as
the ones observed in the empirical networks. Dots correspond to the empirical values
and bars (avg.± 1s.d.) correspond to the model-generated values.
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Figure 6. Niche markets. Panel A shows the variability of each principal component
measured for the product correlation j between communities i in the 1990 Pij network.
Note that we only need the first two components in order to account for the 95% of
the variability. Panel B shows the transformation of the original Pij matrix by its
projection into eigenvectors using the first two principal components. Note that each
community i (dots) is defined by a different trend (i.e. position in the two-dimensional
space). Different years produce similar results.
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Figure 7. An alternative null model. The figure shows the z-score values (y-
axis) for each of the pollination networks (x-axis). The z-score values are given by
Z = (N−Nm)/σm where N is the nestedness value for the empirical network, and Nm
and σm are the average nestedness value and the standard deviation for the null-model-
generated network respectively. The blue line and red line correspond to the standard
null model II [27] and the modified version of the BCmodel using a uniform distribution
for the specialization factor λp respectively. Note that both null models produce a
majority of Z < −2, which indicates that the empirical values are significantly nested
compared to these null models. In contrast, the green line and black line correspond to
the modified versions of the BC model using a uniform distribution for the interaction
factor λlp alone and using a uniform distribution for both factors respectively. Note
that both null models produce a majority of Z > 2, which indicates that the empirical
values are significantly less nested compared to these null models. Dashed lines are
just eye guidelines for Z = 2 and Z = −2, where values above or below these lines
correspond to statistical deviations from empirical values.
